State and Public Policy in Multiethnic Societies:
Two Cases from Europe

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Abstract

Public policy in a multiethnic country is influenced not only by the pattern and nature of socioracial fractionalization, but unavoidably also by the State’s response to the objective exigencies engendered by such pattern and nature of fragmentation. The intrinsic difference in the patterns and nature of fragmentation from country to country, as well as the divergence of the objective exigencies generated and the distinctive (country-specific) responses from the central States, inevitably result not only in differing trends and patterns of public policy evolvement, but also dissimilar roles played by the various public finance instruments. This paper examines the experiences of two European countries from a comparative perspective, focusing in particular on the similarities and contrasts in the various aspects of the institutional background of these countries, including the impact of peripheral (historic homeland) nationalism on the identity and role of the central State and its implications for the “new minorities” in the context of T-T (tempranos-tardíos) intergroup relations.

Introduction

The political and socioeconomic problems confronting multiethnic societies have in recent years attracted increasing attention not only of the politicians and academics, but also the public at large, mainly due to the impact of reethnization of social segments and the widening of inequalities in Eastern Europe and the Balkan conflicts after the collapse of communism. Although ethnic diversity is not an exclusive feature of the developing countries, it is nevertheless critically relevant to them, since economic deprivation or desperate poverty “unduly heightens sensitivities and breeds a general atmosphere of unreasonableness and distrust, making it immensely more difficult to attain solutions to outstanding problems on the basis of a reasonable give and take” (Vasil, 1984:1-2). Thus said, one should be mindful that the threat of ethnic unrest is not solely the bane of third

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world countries. *The Economist* observed in 1965 that the sizzling ethnic tension in Malaysia and Singapore at that time coincided with a week of race riots in Los Angeles, as well as ethnic violence in southern Sudan (cited in Ehrlich and Feldman, 1978:1). The threat of interethnic mistrust looms large and wide. It could both be the scourge afflicting the poor nations, and the sword of Damocles even in times of prosperity.

**The Numerical Structure of Multiethnic States**

Out of their sample of 132 states, Said and Simmons (1976:10) noted that only 9.1 per cent could be considered “ethnic-free”. A total of 18.9 per cent contain an ethnic group which represents more than 90 per cent of the population, and another 18.9 per cent with the largest ethnic group constituting 75-89 per cent of the population. However, in 23.5 per cent of the countries the largest ethnic group accounts for only 50-74 per cent of the population, and in 29.5 per cent of the states it does not constitute half the population. Moreover, in 40.2 per cent of the countries the population consists of five or more significant ethnic groups. According to what he calls “nation-group attributes”, Niellson (1985) classified the world’s population into “single nation-group states”, “one nation-group dominant states”, “one nation-group dominant states with fragmented minorities”, “bi-national states”, and “multinational states”, none of which, however, represents a total congruence of “nation-group” and “state”. With the exception of rare cases like Iceland and the two Koreas, as well as some tiny island states (see Table 1), there is no country in the world that can claim to be ethnically homogeneous; even Niellson’s “single nation-group states” are defined as those in which the nation-group accounts for between 95 and 99.9 per cent of the population.

More significantly, Niellson’s taxonomy points out the importance of the numerical structure of multiethnic states. A distinction can be made between bi-ethnic states (with two major ethnic groups of significant proportions) and states with more than two major ethnic groups. Lijphart (1977:56) remarked, “The notion of a multiple balance of power contains

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1 Based on the "critical mass" theory (advanced, among others, by Semyonov and Tyree [1981]), societies are considered multiethnic only if minorities constitute more than ten per cent of their population.

2 The term "multiethnic" (or "polyethnic") has been generally used in the literature to mean "consisting of more than one ethnic group", i.e. including the bi-ethnic case, although occasionally it is also used in contradistinction to (and thus excluding) the bi-ethnic case. The context will serve to avoid any confusion between this narrower definition of the attribute "multiethnic" from the broader one. An option may be to reserve arbitrarily the term
two separate elements: (1) a balance, or an approximate equilibrium, among the segments, and (2) the presence of at least three different segment.” However, cooperation among groups becomes more difficult, as the number participating in negotiations increases beyond three or four. On the other hand, a moderately multiple configuration is preferable to a dual segmentation as the latter entails a constant tension between “a [majority] hegemony or a precarious balance ... [and it leads] easily to an interpretation of politics as a zero-sum game” (ibid.). Bi-ethnic states are thus a special, problematic type of multiethnic state. In a bi-ethnic state, a gain for one ethnic group could potentially be perceived as a loss for the other. By contrast, in societies with more than two major ethnic groups it may not be apparent who loses when one ethnic group improves its position. This can lead to a logrolling situation, in which each group cares primarily about its own gains and nobody is conscious of the possible costs of a policy decision. The scenario is outlined in Steiner's study on consociationalism in Switzerland (Steiner, 1974). It also implies that ethnic tension could be more easily aroused by preferential policies in bi-ethnic states than in those with more than two ethnic groups.3

**Ethnic Politics and the Politics of Ethnicity**

This paper focuses on the cases of two European countries, in comparison with Malaysia, to throw light on the trichotomy of polity, society and economy, and in particular the political economy of State and ethnicity. Taking into consideration the two major dimensions of ethnopolitics – ethnic politics and the politics of ethnicity4 – the objective of this paper essentially is to look at the role of the State5 in ethnically diverse societies. The

3 Besides the numerical structure of ethnicity, other factors also act to influence ethnic intensity. Among them are whether the ethnic divisions are territorially based, the historical geography (homeland v immigrant) of the ethnic groups, and whether the socioracial cleavages are crosscutting or mutually reinforcing. These will be discussed later in the paper.

4 Ethnic politics includes both government responses to challenges from ethnic communities and the efforts of ethnic organizations seeking to influence state policy, while the politics of ethnicity views ethnicity as a consequence of political action (Gheorghe, 1991).

5 A note on nomenclature: The word "State" (with a capital "S") is used in this paper (except in quotations) to refer to the central body politic of a civil government - in contrast with the private citizenry or a rival authority such as the Church, whereas "state" (with a lower-case "s") refers in general to other senses of the term, including a "country" or a political territory forming part of a country. The word "nation" in this sense is generally avoided since it has the alternative connotation of a community of common ethnic identity, but not necessarily constituting a state.
two European countries, which are at the similar stage of development, are selected for the same ethnic (or more precisely "ethnoterritorial") problem they share as well as the contrasting ethnic composition of their societies. Spain is a multiethnic (or "polyethnic") state with numerous ethnolinguistic fragments (the major groups being the dominant Castilians and the minorities of Catalans, Basques and Gallegans), while Belgium is essentially bi-ethnic (whose population includes the major groups of Francophones and Dutch/Flemish-speakers, and a German minority). Such classification is based not only on numerical strength but also on intergroup power structure. The Asian country that the European cases will be compared to is Malaysia, which is a bi-ethnic state (in Lijphart’s sense of the term) like Belgium but differs from the latter – in particular in the days that led up to the 1969 riots – in being a "deeply-divided society", with mutually reinforcing ethnic markers. It also differs from both Spain and Belgium in the historical geography of ethnicity and the absence of ethnoterritoriality. These different ethnic characteristics together with the different levels of development give rise to distinctively different State responses to exigencies engendered by ethnic fragmentation in these countries.

The Critical Structural Period

What follows is presented in the recognition of the fact that any link between the ethnic diversity and State action is expected to be neither simple nor unidimensional, but is closely intertwined with the effects from other variables, including the historical legacy, pattern of ethnic fragmentation as well as the degree of decentralization of a particular polity. Hage, Hanneman and Gargan (1989:89-91) remarked that theories of the determinants of public spending should not only be problem specific but also period specific. The historical dimension - the timing of State involvement - is a crucial factor (e.g. government-mandated preferential policies came almost two decades later in Fiji than in Malaysia). Levi-Strauss (1967:281-3) perceived time not solely in mechanical, cumulative or statistical terms, but also in social terms – deriving its properties from concrete social phenomena. Complementing his view of ethnicity as a special case of stratification, an analytical perspective concerned with conflict and power (the Weberian approach), Katzenelson

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6 As Beard (1948:220-2) noted:

... many of our neglects, overstresses, and simplifications are due to the divorce of political science from history ... if political science, economics, law and sociology were cut entirely loose from history, they would become theoretical, superficial, and speculative, or what might be worse, merely "practical", that is, subservient to vested interests and politicians temporarily in power.
(1971:69-70) emphasized the importance of the notion of "critical structural periods" – historical periods when "critical structural decisions" are made. In other words, social time rather than historical time, which can be misleading, is the crucial variable. The "critical structural period", when definitive State response to exigencies generated by a country's ethnic diversity, came in the year 1970 both in Malaysia (the implementation of NEP) and in Belgium (beginning of the federalization process), and at the end of the 1970s in Spain (the 1978 Constitution that saw the emergence of the Autonomous Communities, and the approval of the Statutes of Autonomy for all of these Communities from 1979 to 1983). In this paper the latter two countries will be examined in turn to show how decentralization as a dominant ethnic group's reaction to subordinate groups' aspirations affects the role of the State and public finance in post-Franco Spain, and how the "precarious balance" in bi-ethnic Belgium influences its public policy development, in contradistinction to the different role of public expenditure as a tool to enhance dominant group's interests in Malaysia, a country where the intergroup structure is superimposed on the unique historical geography of its ethnic composition, being bi-ethnic yet non-territorial in its racial fragmentation, and at a stage of economic development and political maturity distinct from the other two.

The Degree of Ethnic Fractionalization

To provide a preliminary picture of the comparative ethnic diversity of the countries examined here, a world table of ethnic fractionalization⁸ is given below where Spain, Belgium and Malaysia’s positions in the ranking are highlighted.

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⁷ Citing Schattschneider's remark that "organization is the mobilization of bias" (1961:71), Katznelson noted that critical structural decisions are those that define the "structured relationships" which not only limit but also shape the direction of behavioural choice.

### Table 1

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The index of ethnic fractionalization (EFI) used in Table 1 above is employed here as a measure of a country's degree of racial, ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious fragmentation. The term "racial" is used here to describe group distinction on the basis of phenotypical (i.e. physical) characteristics, while "ethnic" refers to those based solely or partly on cultural characteristics. The term "cultural" here mainly covers the ascriptive attributes

\[
F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( \frac{n_i}{N} \right) \left( \frac{N - 1}{N - 1} \right)
\]

where \( n \) = the number of members of the \( i \)th group and \( N \) = the total number of people in the population (Yeoh, 2003:28). The index is constructed through the computational procedure of Rae and Taylor's index of fragmentation (F), defined as the probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a society will belong to different groups (Rae and Taylor, 1970:22-3). The index varies from 0 to 1. The value is zero for a completely homogeneous country (the probability of belonging to different groups is nil). The value 1 occurs in the hypothetical society where each individual belongs to a different group. The fragmentation index is identical to Rae's measure of party system fractionalization (Rae, 1967:55-8) and Greenberg's measure of linguistic diversity (Greenberg, 1956):

\[
F = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} (P_i)^2
\]

where \( P \) = the proportion of total population in the \( i \)th language group.
"ethnolinguistic" and "ethnoreligious". "Ethnic" therefore is here generalized to be a blanket concept (Hoetink's [1975] attribute "socioracial") to cover all these three aspects of ethnicity - racial, linguistic, and religious.10

Belgium: Regional Dimension in Ethnic Resource Contest

In contradistinction to the case of Malaysia, the regional dimension is crucial in the ethno-economic conflict in Belgium. Interethnic economic competition in Belgium can be described largely in terms of interregional comparative economic development, culminating in the overtaking of Wallonia by Flanders by the early 1970s. It is pertinent here to ask what role the Belgian State played during this period and subsequent ones. In other words, it is important to understand the role of the central government in shaping the economic development in Flanders and Wallonia. This is not an easy question to answer, for it touches upon the country's regional policies which were not only related to the level and type of economic activities in the regions concerned, but also to conditions intrinsic to the accumulation of capital, as well as to the balance of power between social classes, which in turn exerted an influence on the political power structure of the society.

10 Nevertheless, there is an emphasis on language and religion in empirical research due mainly to the fact that they are the relatively less vague factors in the fourfold categorization of ascriptive loyalty (Hoetink, 1975:23-4) - the other two being territoriality (ancestral homeland), notions of common descent ("race"). For accuracy in the measurement of ethnic fractionalization all three major types of non-class cleavages in society are taken into consideration here - racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious. Most of the existing studies on public policy and ethnicity either included only one of these components - Mueller and Murrell's work (1986) that employed linguistic groups as the units of measurement - or considered them as separate variables - McCarty's (1993) "ethnic variance" and "religious variance". While following similar computation procedure as Table 1 and Figure 1 above, language is the only marker used in constructing the ELF (ethno-linguistic fractionalization) in a recent paper by Kuijs (2000) which covers a population of 54 to 79 countries, and race (phenotype) that employed in another by Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1998) that focuses on U.S. cities, metropolitan areas and urban counties. With a bigger sample, however, it is pertinent to consider these components as different manifestations of one single characteristic. In other words, racial (phenotypical), linguistic and religious characteristics represent different markers of ethnic (or socioracial) distinction (often more loosely termed "ethnic markers"). To treat them as separate variables or to employ one to the exclusion of the others inevitably leads to the mismeasurement of the degree of fragmentation. In actual practice, the most significant ethnic marker of a country is employed as the unit of measurement, for instance, race (phenotype) in Rwanda, language in India and religion in Bosnia-Hercegovina, since in reality it is the most prominent cleavage that counts in the polarization of society, though it is in itself often a symbol for social mobilization finding its root in some politico-economic differentiation. Thus, while EF represents the degree of fragmentation in terms of one of the following cleavages: racial, linguistic and religious (with the possibility of some conceptual overlapping among them), exactly which type of cleavage is selected depends on the particular context of the country concerned. For instance, ethnoreligious cleavages provide a more accurate picture of the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina - so do racial differences in Rwanda and Burundi - than linguistic ones, since linguistic homogeneity of these countries is far from reflecting the true degree of their ethnic fragmentation. For further elaboration on the definition of ethnicity for empirical research, see Yeoh (2003).
In May 1971, the Bureau de Programmation Économique published a report in which priority was given to two criteria rather than those four stated by the 1970 law in the distribution of development zones. According to this procedure, 57 per cent of the population of the development zones would be found in Wallonia. However, the Bureau, under obvious Flemish pressure, proposed a choice of zones representing 40 per cent of the country’s population - in violation of the 20 per cent ceiling imposed by the 1970 law - so as to ensure that the population of development zones would be equal in Flanders and Wallonia (Quévit, 1978). Government aid thus became the focus of interethnic resource competition, as noted by Bauvir and Carbonnelle (1975:165): "... en pratique la désignation de ces régions est devenue à chaque fois une sorte d'enjeu politique, et ... a entraîné une tendance à l'extension et à la dispersion de ces zones, à l'encontre de la sélectivité nécessaire proclamée ... (... in practice the designation of these [development] regions has become each time a kind of political issue and ... has led to a tendency of extension and dispersion of these zones, contrary to the necessary selectivity proclaimed ...)") (cited in Quévit, 1978:169). Such extension and dispersion of development zones due to ethnic sensitivity inevitably call for increases in public spending in the form of additional regional aids. The distribution of these aids has always been a focus of contention between the two main ethnic regions. Adding this to the structure of political system - for instance the prevalence of coalition governments in Belgium able to act only on the basis of complex compromises and the thorough politicization of public services (Frognier, 1988), the consequence has been the country's persistent problems with the public finances. Raising more revenue has been difficult, particularly in the frequent periods of political crisis, in view of the inflated spending under the pressures to satisfy all ethnic fragments. The difficulty in raising revenue has caused the government to resort to borrowing - a soft budget constraint that contributed to the country's persistent high debt-GDP ratio which has risen sharply since the late 1960s (Cassiers et al., 1994:6-7). The prospering Flanders' hope to stop further transfer payments to Wallonia is also pushing the former region towards acquiring complete financial and fiscal autonomy, reinforcing the centrifugal tendency already moving the country towards further decentralization and the establishment of a confederal state (Mommen, 1994:223).

Belgium is an interesting case indeed. The controversies over the allocation of government funds owe much to Flanders' expectation of a larger share of subsidies, since it contributes to more than half of the country's population. Such expectations have generated considerable resentment at the substantial subsidies that have gone to the ailing Walloon
steel industry. In fact, during this so-called "War of Apothecaries' Accounts" a decision made to benefit one region always became the basis for a campaign to obtain a comparable benefit for the other region. Murphy (1988:183) noted the example of a decision to build an oil refinery in Wallonia being used by Flemish politicians as an argument for the national government to drop opposition to an oil pipeline between Rotterdam and Antwerp. Such demands for interregional parity have affected "decisions ranging from mine closures and rail abandonments to the construction of roads". In competing for resources, one region sometimes even threatens or acts to undercut the other, as in the case of "a decision by Flemish industrialists to set up an aircraft construction subcontracting business to compete with a similar successful venture in Wallonia or a threat by Walloon industrialists to use the French port of Dunkirk for exports instead of Zeebrugge unless the government provided Wallonia with greater economic subsidies" (ibid.). In the competition over national revenue allocations, especially for economic development projects, economic efficiency is often sacrificed since projects funded in one region often have to be offset by funding for other undertakings in another region. Similar competition is also keen over subsidies for education, scientific research and cultural affairs.

**Homeland-Multiethnic: Spain**

Historically, the Spanish State has always endeavoured to impose a rigid ethnic, religious and cultural homogenization, not least by expelling the two most important minorities – the Jews were exiled by the Catholic Monarchs in 1492, and the Morescoes were banished by Felipe II in 1609. Until the emergence of Basque nationalism the late 19th century, the ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious homogeneity of the Spanish people has never been questioned in the country. The small immigrant minorities – African slaves brought into the country in the 16th and 17th centuries and Germans who settled in the Sierra Morena in the 18th century – were easily assimilated. However, even under this façade of homogeneity, several ethnic groups in Spain have always kept a separate identity, culturally and linguistically – the Catalans (16 percent of the population), mainly in the northeast of the country and on the eastern islands; Galicians (7 percent) in the northwest; Basques, or Euskal-dun (2 percent), mainly around the Bay of Biscay; and the nomadic Gitanos (Gypsies) who are dispersed all over the country, with the greatest number found in Madrid, Barcelona and the larger southern cities. Besides, there are also some less significant but somewhat differentiated groups like the “agotes” in Navarra and the “vaqueiros de alzada” in
Asturias (with the distinctive local language called “bable”). Recent immigration, however, is adding a new element to the ethnic mosaic of the country – the “new minorities”. While there is hardly any incorporation problems for the European immigrants and not much difficulty in the assimilation of Latin Americans given their Hispanic cultural and linguistic background, the integration of Africans and Asians is more problematical. These “new minorities” will be examined later in this paper.

Figure 1 Spain: The Autonomous Communities and Non-Castilian Ethnolinguistic Distribution (native languages in brackets)

While repeatedly expressing confidence that he would leave Spain atado, y bien atado ("tied-up, well tied-up", cited in Gunther, 1980:285), Franco’s death in 1975 was followed within two years by the dismantling of the structure of the whole Franquist regime, and the first free parliamentary elections in over 40 years were held on June 15, 1977. One of the most remarkable development under the democratic transition has been the political decentralization of the State. The issue of regionalism in fact became the most contentious political issue during the post-Franco transition to democracy, with almost one-
tenth of the Constitution devoted to the regional matters. The three main ethnolinguistically non-Castilian regions of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia are given a special status as being "historic regions" – a recognition of the former Statute of Catalonia (1932) which established the Generalitat, Statute of the Basque Country (1936) and the putative Galician statute which was approved but never enacted before all three were crushed by the Franquist regime – which entitled them to the fastest route of all to autonomy.

Although the Autonomous Communities project is not designed solely to resolve the ethnic problems facing the Castilian centre stemming from the "historic regions" of Catalonia and the Basques Country (and to a less extent, Galicia), hence the creation of seventeen instead of two or three such Communities, it cannot be denied that it is the real or potentially centrifugal pressure from these ethnic regions (rendered even more explosive after the long years of Franquist repression) that provided the first and main impetus behind the will to decentralize after the restoration of democracy in 1975. The primary importance of the ethnic regions (which extend beyond the three "historic regions") can be observed in Figures 2 and 3 which show the interregional distribution of public sector resources in 1985, during the early phase of decentralization. The top six regions in 1985 which accounted for 74 per cent of the seventeen regions' total resources were Andalucía, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Madrid and Valencia. Out of the six, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Valencia (which together accounted for 44 per cent of the total regional resources) are ethnolinguistically distinct from Madrid, the Castilian centre. In terms of resource utilization, these six regions accounted for 75 per cent of the total, with Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Valencia alone accounted for 48 per cent of the total. The privileged position of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in the decentralization process is a clear reflection of this concern.

The creation of the other "grade one" (the special route) or "grade two" (the slower track to autonomy) Communities can be seen as an outgrowth of this, while decentralization as such is said to aim at creating a new form of State structure bringing the tax-payers closer to the providers of public services their contributions pay for. Figure 4 shows the remarkable growth of the Spanish regional expenditure due to the Comunidades Autónomas project. The impact of decentralization on public expenditure in the first two decades of the Comunidades Autónomas project is further shown in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 2  Spain: Public Resource Distribution by Region, 1985 (early phase of decentralization)

* Ethnolinguistically non-Castilian regions

Source: Resource use figures from Ortiz Junquera and Roldán Mesanat (1988)

Figure 3  Spain: Public Resource Distribution, 1985 (early phase of decentralization)

* Non-Castilian Regions: Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia, Valencia, the Balearic Islands; the case of the Andalucian ethnogenesis will be examined later.
Figure 4  Spain: Decentralization of Government Expenditure – the First Two Decades

Figure 5  Spain: Total Expenditure as Percentage of GDP at All Levels of Government

Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks; Anuarios Estadísticos de España, Instituto Nacional de Estadística/Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda, Madrid

Figure 6  Spain: Total Expenditure, Current & Capital Expenditures – Ratio of Regional & Provincial Governments to Central Government

Source: As Figure 5.
Homeland-Biethnic: Belgium

The Belgian population is today divided into about 57 per cent Flemish/Dutch-speakers, 42 per cent French-speakers and 1 per cent German-speakers. There are no notable phenotypical divides (except in the case of the "new minorities", mainly migrant workers) and the country is predominantly Catholic (75 per cent of the population). However, such seemingly simple linguistic cleavage is complicated by the fact that Francophones living in Wallonia (Wallonie) cannot readily be identified with those living in Brussels (Bruxelles/Brussel), the capital city located within the boundaries of modern Flanders (Vlaanderen). Similarly, Flemish-speakers living in Brussels do not always identify with those in Flanders (Covell, 1993; Beaufays, 1988; Claeys, 1980). The linguistic frontier in Belgium dates from at least the third century when the Franks crossed the Rhine and settled in the area including the sparsely populated land in the northern part of the present country, establishing their own customs and maintaining the use of their own Germanic language. On the contrary, the Franks were unable to colonize land south of the present linguistic boundary, where the Romance tongue continued to reign supreme (Mallinson, 1963:147-8). On the other hand, the small German-speaking districts in the east were acquired from Germany after the First World War, incorporated into the Third Reich during the Second World War, and restored to Belgium in 1945 (Huggert, 1969:87). The linguistic frontier is a sharply defined one, crossing the land in an east-west direction from just north of Lille in France to Aachen in Germany (Figure 7). While the Flemings constitute a majority of the country's population, they are in a minority in Brussels, which was historically one of the most important Flemish cities. However, what turns such linguistic division into a conflict situation is its socioeconomic implications. The geography of the north-south linguistic frontier notwithstanding, the Belgian nation was born in 1830 with a more complex and provocative frontier within Flanders – a sociolinguistic barrier between the Flemish-speaking masses (peasants, workers and lower middle classes) and their Francophone native élites (Lorwin, 1974:188).

According to the 1980 constitutional revision, there are three communities at the federal level (Flemish-, French- and German-speaking), the subjects of which are determined ratione personae, whereas the subjects of the regions (the Flemish, Walloon
regions and Brussels\(^{11}\)) are determined *ratione loci*. The Flemish community and the Flemish region (which together make up Flanders) have one common executive and legislature, which function independently from the national government and legislature in community as well as regional powers\(^{12}\). The Walloon region, or Wallonia, and the French community (which greatly overlap *ratione loci* but are distinct from each other *ratione materiae*) each has a distinct executive and legislature, also independent from the national government and respectively competent for regional and community matters (*ibid.*:21). The German-speaking community was given the same autonomy and responsibility as the French and Flemish communities.

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**Figure 7** Belgium: Ethnolinguistic Regions

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\(^{11}\) The administrative region of Brussels-Capital is composed of the City of Brussels and 18 neighbouring municipalities. The diminished size of Brussels (to these 19 communes which the Francophones called the "Yoke") is the result of the attack by the Flemish movement (Frognier, Quévit and Stenbock, 1982).

\(^{12}\) The community powers concern cultural and social affairs, health and welfare, while regional powers include regional economic policy, rural development, energy policy, employment, research as well as issues such as environmental protection, physical planning, housing and inland waterways.
The Belgian Dilemma

Jules Destrée, the Belgian politician at the turn of the century, once remarked to King Albert: "Laissez-moi vous dire la vérité, la grande et horrifiante vérité: il n'y a pas de Belges (Let me tell you the truth, the great and horrifying truth: there are no Belgians)." (Jules Destrée, Lettre au Roi sur la séparation de la Wallonie et de la Flandre, 15 août 1912, cited in Quévit, 1982:71) Doubts about the existence of a Belgian identity (belgitude) above those of the Flemings (Vlamingen) and Walloons (Wallons) have dominated much of modern Belgian history. In an industrial unrest generated by the government's drive to curb national debt, Johan van Hecke, the chairman of the Flemish Christian Democrat party, one of the members of the government coalition, was quoted as accusing Wallonia of living off the labours of the Flemings. He warned that his party would "not allow Belgium to be fed by Flanders and milked by Wallonia" - reflecting increasing Flemish resentment of the higher welfare spending on Wallonia in recent years (The Times, UK, 20 December 1995). Figures 8, adopted from Van Hecke (1983), shows the Flanders-Wallonia disparities at the time of the constitutional revision.

Figure 8  Income per capita (at 1980 constitutional revision)

An obvious economic implication of the linguistic conflict is the resulted unproductive increase in government expenditure. The support for separate educational systems and the need to carefully balance programmes of public works in the two regions of Flanders and Wallonia inevitably impose strains on the Treasury (Huggett, 1969:205). As Pierre Harmel, a former Belgian premier, complained in 1965, the country has developed the habit of "buying out political discords at the expense of the public treasury" (Lyon, 1971:135). However, linguistic division is not the sole social cleavage that leads to such increase in public expenditure. For instance, during the 1960s, as a solution to le problème scolaire - the four-year schools war settled in 1958, the State subsidized a double network of both Church and lay schools, which involves costly duplication, resulting in expensive education at all levels and a severe drain on the budget (ibid.).

Government aid is, nevertheless, not the only major contentious issue between the two communities in the economic sphere. In fact, regionalization of some, but not all, economic matters has created a complex set of structures that has adversely affected the efficiency and feasibility of long-term planning and led to a disruption of multisectoral coordination and integration (Swyngedouw, 1985). For instance, as a result of regionalization, the country's national water regulatory body, which dated from 1913, was divided into Flemish and Walloon branches, despite the obvious advantage of maintaining national control over water management given the fact that much of the country's water comes from sources in the South. The breaking up of the national body created a wide range of interregional conflicts over the control of water pollution and the questions of water allocation (Murphy, 1988:167-8). Vanwynsbergh's analysis (1979) on 19 sectors and 5 regions (Brussels-Capital, Flemish Brabant, Walloon Brabant, the four Flemish provinces and four Walloon provinces) over the period 1970-74 in fact reveals more complementarity, rather than contradictions, between regions. Regionalization, he concluded, tends to accentuate the contradictions and ignore these economic links.

Meanwhile, Flanders has continued to strengthen its position as the economic centre of Belgium, not only at the expense of Wallonia (that has suffered continuous "peripheralization", especially in economic terms), but also of Brussels, reflecting a complete turnabout vis-à-vis the situation at the beginning of this century (Frognier, Quévit and Stenbock (1982). This occurs in the context of a parallel projection of population growth in the three regions, showing a slowing down in the increase in population in Flanders as well as in the decrease in Brussels (Installé et al., 1989), which also justifies
the Walloons’ worry about the lower rate of population increase among the Francophones of Belgium. As in Malaysia, comparative demographic trends represent an important issue. This is so in Belgium because resource allocation is now being tied in many cases to regional population size. Compromises have so far generally involved granting Flanders more than 50 per cent of the budget, in view of its larger population. However, with the population growth gradually slowing down in Flanders, the gap between the two regions may indeed be narrowing.

There are a number of similarities between Belgium and Malaysia. In terms of ethnic power relations, both countries can be considered "bi-ethnic" societies 13. Both can be described as small, open economies. Just as direct State intervention in the Malaysian economy began with the implementation of the New Economic Policy in 1970, in Belgium the central government directly involved itself in the investment policy of the private sector after the promulgation of the laws of economic expansion in 1959. In terms of population size, the countries are similar, especially before 1969.

Spain: The “New Minorities”

Our discussion has so far focussed on the main contending ethnic groups in the power structure of various countries, viz. the two homeland groups (Walloons and Flemings) in bi-ethnic Belgium, and the various homeland groups (Castilians, Catalans, Basques and Gallegans) in Spain. We have so far ignored the less significant (in terms of power contest) groups like the “new minorities” (immigrants from Latin America, Asia and Africa) in the other two countries.

According to official statistics, there are at present between 2.5 and 3 million foreigners in Spain, of which only about 1.8 million are with residence permit. That is to say, those who are “sin papeles” (without permit) totaled more than one million. Besides EU nationals (mainly Britons, Germans and Italians), these foreigners are mainly from

13 To describe Belgium and Malaysia as bi-ethnic is not to deny the fact that their populations consist of more than three distinct ethnic groups or that each of these three contains its own subgroups. These other groups or subgroups are however too small in number and too fragmented to exert any real influence within the power structure of the countries concerned. The Dusun-Kadazans in the Borneo part of the Malaysian Federation, though playing a significant role in local politics, have little influence outside the state of Sabah or in the political centre on the Peninsula.
Latin America (about 32%, mainly some 190000 Ecuadoreans and 120000 Colombians) and Africa (about 25%, mainly the more than 350000 Moroccans). The majority of the immigrants (about 90%) are in the capital and the region of Catalonia. There are about 300,000 immigrants living in Madrid today, with around the same number in Catalonia. The remaining 10% of immigrants are in the vast southern region of Andalucía, as well as Valencia and the Balearic islands. Both Valencia and the Balearic Islands are regions ethnolinguistically distinct from Castilian centre. Half of the people in Valencia speak Valencian, a variety of Catalan; more than 70% of the Balearic islanders speak Mallorquí, also a variety of Catalan. As we will observe below regarding the ethnogenesis movement in Andalucía, this means that besides Madrid, most of the immigrants actually end up either in the ethnolinguistically non-Castilian autonomous communities or regions with a strong ethnic movement. In comparison with the other western European countries, the percentage of immigrants in Spain (5%) can be considered rather low. Such notwithstanding, racism against these “new minorities”, however subtle, are not unheard of. Though rare, it can even take violent forms, as had occurred in the community of El Ejido in the southern province of Almería, Andalucía.

**El Ejido Burning**

Violence erupted in El Ejido in early 2000 when a Moroccan man was arrested on suspicion of stabbing to death a Spanish woman in a local market. This came two weeks after another Moroccan man was arrested in connection with the stabbing to death of two people. Although the police had said that there is no evidence that the immigrant community is committing more crimes than anyone else, hundreds of local people began marching through El Ejido shouting racist slogans, and proceeded on the rampage, burning cars and shops belonging to Moroccans – a minority that constituted just one-tenth of the local population, who mainly worked in agriculture, picking and planting fruit and vegetables – low-paid and back-breaking work which Spaniards shun. While several thousand people went on the worst rampage of racial violence in the recent history of the country, wrecking businesses, shops and bars owned by immigrants, and beating up

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14 In cities like Madrid and Barcelona it is about 10%.

15 El Ejido is the centre for fruit and vegetable production, which relies heavily on cheap immigrant labour – on Spain’s southern coast.
Moroccan workers, the local police, under the control of the populist mayor Juan Enciso, did not seem to try to stop the rioters. Six hundred police reinforcements were sent from Madrid two days later, and it took several days to restore order. The mayor, meanwhile, resisted pressure from the prime minister, Jose Maria Aznar, to condemn the violence, vetoed a plan for the Red Cross to set up a camp for the immigrants whose shacks had been destroyed in the riots and helped provoke the resignation of the liberal labour minister, Manuel Pimental, who had spoken out in support of the immigrants.

Yet El Ejido was not an isolated incident. Earlier in July 1999, there had been three nights of violence against North African immigrants in the north-eastern town of Tarrasa, near Barcelona, when hundreds of angry residents took to the streets shouting "Moroccans out" and "No more Moroccans" and attacked shops and cars of the immigrants.

A few things are readily observable in the pogrom in El Ejido – features that are common in such incidents elsewhere, elements that are not completely strange to Malaysians who had personal experience of the racial violence in 1969 or the boiling ethnic tension in 1987. First is the role of politicians – in particular the populist mayor – and the local police, which the Spanish media had put the blame on. Van Dijk (2005) has highlighted the views expressed by such conservative politicians in the historic autonomous regions who condone or flirt with xenophobic ideas:

Heribert Barrera, former president of the Catalan parliament, published a book with explicitly xenophobic remarks, declaring himself in agreement with right-wing Austrian politician Haider … Former Catalan leader Jordi Pujol, in his last major speech in Catalan Parliament, declared on October 2, 2002 immigration to be one of the most “problematic facts” of Catalonia of the last years. He insisted that it is a general problem for developed countries, but in Catalonia it has specific significance because immigration can affect “our identity” … Two years later, in a lecture for the Catalan Summer School in August 2004, Pujol defended the integration of immigrants in Catalonia, but without “going as far as miscegenation”, which would be “end of Catalonia”. Similar interventions of Pujol in 2004 basically repeated the same theme of the alien “threat” to Catalan language and culture. It appears from these interventions that maintaining national ‘identity’ is crucial for conservative Catalan nationalist leaders like Pujol. If an autonomous region or nation like Catalonia should have a “central” or “dominant” culture, this culture should be Catalan culture.

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16 When violence erupted, although the story quickly reached the national news, pictures of the actual violence were few because, along with immigrants, journalists were also under attack by the mob.
The implication of homeland ethno-regional nationalism in this specific Spanish scenario on the treatment of the “new minorities” will be further explored later. Next on the list of what can be observed in the El Ejido riots comes the lack of political power on the part of the immigrants, partly due to the small size and the lack of ethnic intensity that have been discussed above, partly because of the dispersed nature of the immigrant population.

Historical Geography of Ethnicity and T-T Intergroup Relations

_The first man who, having enclosed a piece of land, thought of saying ‘This is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the true founder of civil society. How many crimes, wars, murders; how much misery and horror the human race would have been spared if someone had pulled up the stakes and filled in the ditch and cried out to his fellow men: ‘Beware of listening to this impostor. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to everyone and that the earth itself belongs to no one!’_


The discussion in the previous sections has repeatedly brought up the issue of homeland-immigrant dichotomy. The critical difference between two distinct types of ethnicity – _homeland_ and _immigrant_ ethnic groups – indeed requires recognition. Their definition is subjective, being related to the real or mythical attachment of an ethnic group to the land on which it resides (Smith, 1981; Murphy, 1989). Ethnic identity is generally more intense and more ascriptive in homeland communities than in immigrant societies. It is also more explicitly expressed in patterns of political organization and spatial segregation in states composed of the former (Esman, 1985). Homeland communities are sometimes described as "plural" (or "deeply divided") to differentiate them from immigrant societies which are often described as "pluralistic" (Garcia, 1980).17 Nevertheless, the

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17 The degree of pluralism itself as a salient aspect of societal differentiation is defined by Lofchie (1968) as characteristics of a society with the basic features of: sharply defined cleavages between its culturally differentiated segments; a pronounced tendency for the culturally distinguishable groups to have different positions in the society's economy, division of labour, and social structure; and the fact that political power is attached almost entirely to one of the cultural segments, to the exclusion of the others. Operationally, pluralism is distinguished by "the relative absence of value consensus; the relative rigidity and clarity of group definition; the relative presence of conflict, or, at least, of lack of integration and complementarity between various parts of the social system; the segmentary and specific character of relationships; and the relative existence of sheer institutional duplication (as opposed to functional differentiation or specialization) between the various segments of the society" (van den Berghe, 1964:12). From a study of forty-eight modern and underdeveloped, ex-colonial and noncolonial nations, Bagley (1972) further distinguished between two situations, namely, "racialism", which he found in developed countries when one bloc clearly dominates another, and "pluralism",

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homeland-immigrant categorization has increasingly been attracting criticism. Not least is the stigma that the so-called “indigenous” groups insist on forcing upon the descendants of the immigrants by continuing to tag them “immigrants” even when they are generations removed from their forefathers who first migrated to the land. Also being questioned by these descendants of immigrants is the imbalance in rights often claimed by the “homeland” groups who in the eyes of the former are simply distinguished from them by having forefathers who arrived in the land much earlier in historical, or prehistoric, times. Anthropological studies had placed the origins of modern humans in southern Africa or the Middle East. Evolving 90000 to 180000 years ago, these humans then migrated to all parts of the world, supplanting the local, earlier Homo sapiens populations. So in this sense, every so-called indigenous people in any part of the world can be considered descendants of immigrants who had moved into the land and lived there from time immemorial. With this line of reasoning, the new immigrant minorities of Spain (e.g. Moroccans in Andalucía, Andalusians in Catalonia) would considered themselves simply as people who are los tardíos en llegar (latecomers) vis-à-vis the locals who are descendants of los tempranos en llegar (early comers).18 Similarly, each of the successive peoples who came earlier to the Iberian Peninsula and who had historically contributed to the ethnological mixture of the Spanish people – the Romans (Mediterranean), the Suevi, the Vandals and the Visigoth (who were Teutonic), a well as the Semitic and other peoples – was in ethnological terms “tardíos” who came to add on to the already mixed stock of the “tempranos”. The long history of population movement, settlement and resettlement, the reshuffling and mingling of genetic elements through the weaving of biological interrelationship like intermarriage and other forms of miscegenation had since blurred all notions of the early comers and latecomers. Given this historical backdrop, it is interesting to note that political leaders like Jordi Pujol, as we just noted above, still posited in public discourse the threat of “miscegenation” to “racial purity”.

This T-T (tempranos-tardíos) distinction is crucial as a determinant in the analysis of ethnic coexistence, intergroup conflict, public policy and ethnic response in a multiethnic (including "bi-ethnic") society. Consider here a trichotomous taxonomy of multiethnic states in less developed countries where no one bloc clearly dominates any other. An attempt to replicate Bagley’s study by extending his indices on pluralism and racialism can be found in Cooper (1974).

18 The T-T (tempranos-tardíos) dichotomy is not only important but also useful in view of the increasing taboo on the use of the term “immigrant” (“pendatang” in Malay) in public discourse.
based on their ethnic historical geography\textsuperscript{19}: “homeland-multiethnic states”, “immigrant-multiethnic states” and “mixed-multiethnic states”.

The first category refers to those composed of two or more homeland ethnic groups of significant proportions\textsuperscript{20}. Spain and Belgium belong to this category, which also includes, among others, Britain, Italy, Nigeria, India, Russia and the former Yugoslavia\textsuperscript{21}. The second category refers to immigrant states that consist of more than one major tardío ethnic group (descendants of immigrants) but are devoid of significant temprano communities, \textit{e.g.} the United States, Canada, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago\textsuperscript{22}. The essential features of an immigrant-multiethnic society are that its settlers (and therefore their descendants) are diverse in ethnicity, and that all settlers feel an equally legitimate claim upon it, regardless of their ethno-national background.

\textbf{Concentrated v Dispersed Minorities}

There are various patterns of demographic intermingling. Groups can be intermingled on a regional scale - regions are heterogeneous but small communities are homogeneous, as in Malaysia in the 1960s and 70s, or on a local scale where even small communities are heterogeneous, as in Sarajevo and many parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina before the recent war (van Evera, 1994). The power relationship between the dominant and the subordinate groups is influenced by the extent to which the latter is located in a particular regional (or urban) setting — whether it is a "concentrated" or "dispersed" community (van Amersfoort, 1978:229). A subordinate group that forms a numerical

\textsuperscript{19} This classification follows Yiftachel (1992).

\textsuperscript{20} The issue of "numerical significance", nevertheless, is not the sole criterion involved here, as explained in two subsequent footnotes.

\textsuperscript{21} To categorize these countries as homeland-multiethnic states is not to deny the possible existence of substantial immigrant communities in these countries. These tardío "new minorities" are, however, not seen as such important players in the political arena as the temprano/homeland communities, \textit{e.g.} the Castilians, Catalans and Basques of Spain, who are directly responsible for the identity and survival of these countries as national entities.

\textsuperscript{22} Although pure immigrant states (where the major ethnic groups that are politically significant are all tardío communities whose times of arrival are more or less the same — any temprano communities that exist, such as the Amerindians, are demographically minor and politically powerless) like Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago best fit this category, small segments of its population being temprano ethnic groups does not disqualify a state from this immigrant country status. The United States of America, for instance, is considered an immigrant state despite the existence of the temprano communities of the Amerindians. As in the definition of homeland multiethnic states, it is the politically important ethnic groups that matter, for instance the blacks and whites in the US, the Anglophones and Francophones in Canada.
majority in certain regions of a state (or lives in large numbers in inner city areas, like the Pakistanis in Bradford, England) may have greater politico-economic leverage than a more "dispersed" community. In terms of political influence in a democracy, Lee (1983) noted that the vote of a concentrated minority may be more effective than that of a dispersed community under a "winner takes all" electoral system.

Van Amersfoort (1978) has attempted to derive a typology of "majority-minority" relations by combining the orientations of dispersed and concentrated subordinate groups with three dimensions of dominant group aspirations. Using the terms "dominant" (or "superordinate") and "subordinate" that convey more accurately the power dimension, instead of van Amersfoort's "majority" and "minority" which can be semantically confusing when size and power do not coincide, Figure 9 illustrates a number of probable outcomes produced by this configuration. This typology is useful for an understanding of the contrast in State actions between the countries examined here.

Figure 9  Typology of Dominant-Subordinate Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>orientation of dominant group</th>
<th>dispersed subordinate group's orientation</th>
<th>concentrated subordinate group's orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Universalistic</td>
<td>Particularistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emancipation</td>
<td>emancipation process</td>
<td>sectarian minority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuation</td>
<td>suppression (struggle for emancipation)</td>
<td>reservation situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elimination</td>
<td>forced assimilation or extermination</td>
<td>forced assimilation or extermination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dominant Group’s Orientation: Emancipation

Ethnic consciousness and ethnic intensity, which are associated with the tempranos/tardíos dichotomy and territorial policies in countries with considerable degree of sectionalism, play a crucial role in determining public policy in a multiethnic society. From this perspective, the goals of the dominant and subordinate groups are of particularly great importance. Van Amersfoort summarized the objectives of the dominant community into three major categories that he termed "emancipation", "continuation" and "elimination". Emancipation policies aim to ensure full citizenship rights for the subordinate without insisting on their cultural or structural assimilation. Such policies do not require subordinate communities to disappear as a distinct entity. To a large extent such are the policies pursued in post-Franco Spain (a radical transformation from the elimination policies, examined below, of the Franco years) and Belgium (close but not completely satisfactory policy description due to the lack of a clearly subordinate community).23

A Note on “Exotic Minorities”

“Emancipation” as a policy option can sometimes be due to the dominant group's perception of the subordinate group/groups as "exotic" rather than "real" (Hoetink, 1973:177-91). An example of such an "exotic" minority in Malaysia is the small Gente Kristang community (autoglossonym, from Portuguese “Gente Cristã”) in the state of Melaka, descended from the 16th century Portuguese settlers and occupiers. Defined as "deviating in somatic and/or cultural respects, without being conceived subjectively as a menace to the existing social order" (Hoetink, 1967), "exotic" groups (or Cox's [1948] ethnic "strangers") are not perceived as "real", because they are not subjectively comprised within the "societal image" of the dominant. Thus they do not attract the latter's hostility, as do "real" subordinate groups viewed as a menace. The case of the Ainus and the Burakumins in Japan and that of the Amerindians and Afro-Americans in the United States today are good examples of these two polar subordinate situations - the Ainus and Amerindians being in some way viewed as "exotic" vis-à-vis the other two "real" minorities; instead of bitterness and hostility, they are met with "a mild benevolence, a condescending philanthropy" on the part of the dominant society (Hoetink, 1973:179). Such distinction

23 In contrast with Malaysia where the policy choice seems to lie somewhere in the middle of the three options.
between the two types of subordinate groups was vividly described by Devos in his study of the Burakumins: “The basic attitudes held [by the dominant Japanese society] toward the Ainu are not as pejorative as towards the outcastes [i.e. the Burakumin] ... the Ainu have been treated ambivalently very much as the American Indians have been, in contrast to the caste distinctions which underlie the treatment of American blacks.” (Devos, 1972:326)

**Dominant Group’s Orientation: Continuation**

Continuation policies seek to preserve the existing relationship between the dominant and the subordinate. The reason may be that the subordinate group performs certain functions for the dominant or is being exploited by the latter. However, the goal of continuation can also arise from passive rather than active policies - "a refusal to pursue a policy of active emancipation for a minority that has become part of the society in the course of historical development" (Van Amersfoort, op.cit.:230). Certain minorities – e.g. the Roma (Gypsy) community, called the “Gitanos” in Spain – may prefer to be left alone to pursue a symbiotic, though unequal, relationship with the dominant society.

**Dominant Group’s Orientation: Elimination**

Elimination policies can be pursued in two ways. The dominant society may undertake measures aimed at the forced assimilation of the subordinate group by suppressing its constituent elements such as language, religion or culture, e.g. the suppression of the Chinese language in Indonesia under the Suharto regime, Iran's persecution of the Baha'is and Turkey's repressive policy against Kurdish language and culture. It may also attempt the physical extermination of the subordinate group, e.g. the expulsion of Asians from Uganda by the Idi Amin regime, population transfer during the partition of India, the genocide against Chinese in the history of Indonesia and the Philippines, and the "ethnic cleansing" occurred in the successor states of former Yugoslavia in recent years.
Fourfold Response to Subordinate Status

While the dominant groups vary in their attitudes towards the subordinate communities, the latter may aim to achieve different relationships with the rest of the society. Wirth (1945) suggested a framework that allows for a fourfold response to subordinate (or "minority") status: pluralistic, assimilationist, secessionist and militant. Aiming to live side by side with, though not to be a part of, the dominant group, a pluralistic subordinate group seeks the dominant society's toleration for its differences. It achieves its goal when "it has succeeded in wrestling from the dominant group the fullest measure of equality in all things economic and political and the right to be left alone in all things cultural" (Wirth, 1945:357). While the pluralistic subordinate group is content with the dominant group's toleration and aims at no more than cultural autonomy, its assimilationist counterpart aspires to be integrated unidentifiably into the dominant group. Working towards complete acceptance by the latter, this minority aims to merge eventually with the larger society. On the other hand, a secessionist (or separatist) community seeks to achieve political as well as cultural independence from the dominant group, by repudiating assimilation and scorning mere toleration or cultural autonomy. Lastly, a militant community attempts to assert its dominance over others, which may include the existing dominant group. In a description that befits the Serbian minority's conquest of Bosnia before the tide of war turned in late 1995 (in contrast to the four-year Serbian secessionism in Croatian Vojna Krajina)\(^\text{24}\), Wirth depicted the ambitions of a militant minority:

*Far from suffering from feelings of inferiority, it is convinced of its own superiority and inspired by the lust for conquest. While the initial claims of minority movements are generally modest, like all accessions of power, they feed upon their own success and often culminate in delusions of grandeur.*

*(ibid.:363)*

Can Dominants and Subordinates Be Free of Conflict?

In terms of orientation, Van Amersfoort defined universalistic subordinates as those that aim at participation in society and demand equality and, in general, also the preservation of alternative roles. They thus correspond to Wirth's "pluralistic", and to a

\(^{24}\)The fact that ethnicity is more territorially based in Croatia than in Bosnia shows the significance of the pattern of settlement – regional concentration or intermingling – in determining the type of minority movement.
less extent, "assimilationist minorities". In the case of concentrated subordinates, universalism can take on the form of regionalism. While also aspiring to improve their position, particularistic subordinates "do not demand 'equal' rights with the [dominants], but derive their rights from their own particularistic value system" (van Amersfoort, 1978:230). They thus correspond to Wirth's "secessionist" and "militant minorities". Figure 9 demonstrates that a stable relationship between the dominants and subordinates free of conflict is an exception rather than a rule, since only two out of a total of twelfth cells formed by the interface of dominant-subordinate orientations – those marked "emancipation process" and "federalism" – suggest the prospect of a stable form of participation in society by subordinate groups. Federalism, which represents the current State response to ethnic conflict in the two stable Western democracies of Spain and Belgium, is thus far from a prevalent phenomenon in the world context. Furthermore, federalism as a policy option was selected for these countries to solve the problems engendered by the self-determination aspirations of the homeland ethno-regional minorities who are significant in the countries’ power-configuration. But what is the implication of this for the “new minorities”?

**Historic (Homeland) Minorities’ Nationalism and the “New Minorities”**

Two types of nationalism can be identified in terms of the treatment of minorities: minority-respecting and minority-oppressing. Van Evera (1994) noted that many nationalisms of immigrant nations (e.g. American, Anglo-Canadian) have been relatively minority-respecting, while homeland nationalisms often display less tolerance for their minorities (e.g. the plight of the Kurdish minorities of Iraq and Turkey, Turks in Bulgaria, Serbs in Croatia and Albanians in Serbia). Behind this lies the relative intensity, linked to the feeling of legitimacy, of the claim to land the groups reside. This also include peripheral nationalism of regional (homeland) minorities’ sentiment towards other homeland/tardío minorities in their midst. Kendra Clegg, in her study of the Sasak people in Lombok, Indonesia, observed that while “[r]egional autonomy allows local communities to strengthen their cultures and identities … it may also marginalise minority groups.” She found that “[p]oliticising Sasak identity has meant the promotion of a single cultural identity, which disguises the great diversity of understandings of ‘Sasak’.” (Clegg, 2004) On the treatment of “new minorities” by the “peripheral nationalisms” in Spain, van Dijk (2005) remarked:
[The] autonomous-nationalist and conservative attitudes about immigrants tend to be based on related ideologies, as they are both associated with nationalist values. This resemblance may paradoxically be found in the two opposed forms of centralist and regional nationalisms in Spain, respectively. That is, we have on the one hand the official – and hence often tacit while presupposed – nationalism of the Spanish State, at present especially embodied by the conservative party, a nationalism that opposes any infringement on the unity of Spain. This centralist nationalism continues the Falangist tradition under Franco, who emphasized the unity of Spain, and who repressed any form of linguistic diversity and political autonomy of the nations of Euskadi or Catalonia. Given the current forms of regional autonomy, both the conservative and socialist parties at the national level oppose tendencies for more autonomy in Euskadi and Catalonia. On the other hand we have the ‘peripherical’ nationalisms that may be found in the historic autonomous regions, especially those with their own language, such as Catalonia, Euskadi and Galicia. Especially the more radical conservative brands of both ideologies have the tendency to oppose multiculturalism, multilingualism, immigration or any other way “national unity” or cultural or linguistic homogeneity are seen to be threatened. Thus, for some conservative nationalists in the historic autonomous regions, too many immigrants might unbalance the delicate consensus of a system in which the autonomous project is dominant, for instance when it comes to teaching and using Catalan in Catalonia.

And the sentiment of the electorate is no less alarming:

Some 1990 statistics suggest that less than half of the people who vote for nationalist parties in Euskadi and Catalonia accept the thesis that foreigners should have the same rights as people from Spain, a thesis accepted by more than two-thirds of those who vote for other parties … Similarly, research suggests that voters of more radical autonomous-nationalist parties also tend to have less sympathy for Arabs, Blacks and Gitanos … This reaction against immigrants in the historic autonomous regions of Spain has a longer tradition, and also was directed against immigrants from other parts of Spain, especially from Andalusia …

(iband.)

And this brings us to the question of Andalucía.

The Inverted Paradigm: Public Policy-Induced Ethnogenesis and Polarization

Incidentally, the southern province of Almería, where El Ejido is located, is in Andalucía, which is not supposed to be considered part of the ethnolinguistically non-Castilian “historic” regions with separatist sentiments. Now, let us conclude this paper by taking a look at an inverted paradigm in contrast with the discussion so far, using the case of Andalucía. Andalucía, of course, is Castilian. Nevertheless, what uneven development and public policy can do to fuel regional separatist sentiments is evident even in Andalucía where the population has little ethnolinguistic differences from the Spanish (Castilian) political centre, for while government responds to challenges from ethnic community organizations that seek to influence public policy, "within an inverted and complementary paradigm … ethnic communities take shape as response to stimuli which induce a process
of ethnogenesis" (Gheorghe, 1991:842-3). The shockingly rapid emergence since the late 1970s (with the advent of the Comunidades Autónomas project) of a politically disciplined and powerful regional cultural identity in Andalucía, which Greenwood (1985) argued to be as authentic as the Basque or Catalan ethnic movement, basically stems from the local people's grievances that they have been subjected to centuries of exploitation not merely by Andalucian capitalists, but by the Castilian political centre as well. This interesting phenomenon of public policy-induced ethnogenesis evident in the large southern impoverished Spanish region of Andalucía, which shares the linguistic identity of the Spanish (Castilian) centre, is the direct result of the post-Franco Comunidades Autónomas project. "The rapidity with which a politically disciplined and powerful regional cultural identity has emerged in Andalucía shocked everyone ..." commented Greenwood (1985:222-3), "... the idea that the Andalucian movement is something qualitatively different from the 'true' ethnic movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia must be exploded."25

This phenomenon of public policy-induced ethnogenesis is also evident in the increasing support since the 1980s for Italy's Northern League, whose leader has declared the aim to set up a state called "Padania" free from Rome's rule and from union with the poorer South.26 Such centrifugal development in Italy, of course, reflects the increasing resentment of the more prosperous North for having to subsidize the poorer South and a tax revolt against Rome.27 Although from the ethnolinguistic perspective the country is relatively homogeneous (with small Sard, Friul, German and Occitan minorities), Italy's late but rapid unification has left a legacy of widespread "pseudo-ethnic" sectionalism, which is no less ascriptive than what Greenwood found in Andalucía, across its numerous regions and compartments, partly reflected linguistically in the local dialecti or koinés.

25 Reference should be made here to the controversial hypothesis of Rabushka (1974) that larger public sector is the cause of greater likelihood of ethnic conflict.

26 The Times, UK, 26 March 1996. From humble beginnings in the 1980s, the Northern League has since been transformed from a marginal protest force to a national movement strong enough to bring down the 1994 Centre-Right coalition by withdrawing from it. The proposed "Padania" (the ancient Italian term for the Po valley) would contain the most powerful industries of Italy, its best agricultural land, almost all its financial wealth and its greatest cities including Venice (the proposed capital), Turin, Milan, Bologna and Genoa.

27 It is exactly the same sentiment that is threatening the Belgian nation, driving Flanders away from Wallonia.
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